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What return should investors expect the stock market to deliver, above the interest
rate on a safe short-term investment? In other words, what is a reasonable estimate
of the equity premium?
This question is a basic one for investors who must decide how to allocate their
portfolios to safe and risky assets. In the academic world, it has for over three
decades played a central role in the development of asset pricing theory and ﬁnancial
econometrics. In the 1960’s and 1970’s, the eﬃcient market hypothesis was interpreted
to mean that the true equity premium was a constant. Investors might update their
estimates of the equity premium as more data became available, but eventually these
estimates should converge to the truth. This viewpoint was associated with the use
of historical average excess stock returns to forecast future returns.
In the early 1980’s, a number of researchers reported evidence that excess stock
returns could be predicted by regressing them on lagged ﬁnancial variables. In par-
ticular, valuation ratios that divide accounting measures of cash ﬂow by market val-
uations, such as the dividend-price ratio, earnings-price ratio, or smoothed earnings-
price ratio, appeared to predict returns. Value-oriented investors in the tradition of
Graham and Dodd (1934) had always asserted that high valuation ratios are an indi-
cation of an undervalued stock market and should predict high subsequent returns,
but these ideas did not carry much weight in the academic literature until authors
such as Rozeﬀ (1984), Fama and French (1988), and Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b)
found that valuation ratios are positively correlated with subsequent returns and
that the implied predictability of returns is substantial at longer horizons. Around
the same time, several papers pointed out that yields on short- and long-term Trea-
sury and corporate bonds are correlated with subsequent stock returns (Fama and
Schwert 1977, Keim and Stambaugh 1986, Campbell 1987, Fama and French 1989).
These results suggested that the equity premium is not a constant number that
can be estimated ever more precisely, but an unknown state variable whose value
must be inferred at each point in time on the basis of observable data. Meanwhile
research in asset pricing theory made ﬁnancial economists more comfortable with the
i d e at h a tt h ee q u i t yp r e m i u mc a nc h a n g eo v e rt i m ee v e ni na ne ﬃcient market with
rational investors, so that a time-varying equity premium does not necessarily require
abandonment of the traditional paradigm of ﬁnancial economics for a behavioral or
ineﬃcient-markets alternative. Campbell and Cochrane (1999), for example, showed
1that rational investors with habit formation preferences might become more averse
to volatility in consumption and wealth, driving up the equilibrium equity premium,
when the economy is weak.
During the 1990’s, research continued on regressions predicting stock returns from
valuation ratios (Kothari and Shanken 1997, Lamont 1998, Pontiﬀ and Schall 1998)
and interest rates (Hodrick 1992). However the 1990’s also saw challenges to the new
view that valuation ratios predict stock returns.
A ﬁr s tc h a l l e n g ec a m ef r o mﬁnancial econometricians, who began to express con-
cern that the apparent predictability of stock returns might be spurious. Many of
the predictor variables in the literature are highly persistent: Nelson and Kim (1993)
and Stambaugh (1999) pointed out that persistence leads to biased coeﬃcients in pre-
dictive regressions if innovations in the predictor variable are correlated with returns
(as is strongly the case for valuation ratios, although not for interest rates). Under
t h es a m ec o n d i t i o n st h es t a n d a r dt-test for predictability has incorrect size (Ca-
vanagh, Elliott, and Stock 1995). These problems are exacerbated if researchers are
data mining, considering large numbers of variables and reporting only those results
that are apparently statistically signiﬁcant (Foster, Smith, and Whaley 1997, Ferson,
Sarkissian, and Simin 2003). An active recent literature discusses alternative econo-
metric methods for correcting the bias and conducting valid inference (Cavanagh,
Elliott, and Stock 1995, Lewellen 2004, Torous, Valkanov, and Yan 2004, Campbell
and Yogo 2006, Jansson and Moreira 2006, Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho 2006,
Ang and Bekaert 2007, Cochrane 2007).
A second challenge was posed by ﬁnancial history. In the late 1990’s valuation
ratios were extraordinarily low, so regression forecasts of the equity premium became
negative (Campbell and Shiller 1998). Yet stock returns continued to be high until
after the turn of the millennium. Data from these years were suﬃciently informative
to weaken the statistical evidence for stock return predictability. Although low returns
in the early 2000’s have partially restored this evidence, Goyal and Welch (2003, 2007)
and Butler, Grullon, and Weston (2005) have argued that overall, the out-of-sample
forecasting power of valuation ratios is often worse than that of a traditional model
predicting the equity premium using only the historical average of past stock returns.
The ultimate test of any predictive model is its out-of-sample performance. My
personal experience using regression models to forecast stock returns in the late 1990’s
was humbling, although these models were partially vindicated by the stock market
decline of the early 2000’s. The lesson I draw from this experience is that one is more
2likely to predict stock returns successfully if one uses ﬁnance theory to reduce the
number of parameters that must be freely estimated from the data, and to restrict
estimates of the equity premium to a reasonable range.
In the next section of this paper I show how ﬁnance theory can be used if one
believes that valuation ratios, in particular the dividend-price ratio, are stationary
around a constant mean. Even under stationarity, the persistence of valuation ratios
has led researchers to concentrate on situations where valuation ratios have a root
that is close to unity. In section 3 I discuss the limiting case where one believes
that the dividend-price ratio follows a geometric random walk. I show that this case
allows an even larger role for theory: it implies that one should forecast returns by
adding a growth estimate to the dividend-price ratio, in the manner of the classic
Gordon growth model. I argue that this approach has generated successful out-of-
sample forecasts historically, and is likely to do so in the future as well. In section
4 I apply this methodology to estimate the current equity premium for Canada, for
the US, and for the world stock market as a whole. In section 5 I brieﬂyd i s c u s sh o w
ﬁnance theory can be used to predict the equity premium from the cross-section of
stock prices. Section 6 concludes.
2 Regression-based return prediction with a sta-
tionary dividend-price ratio
When the dividend-price ratio is stationary, a basic tool for analyzing stock returns
is the loglinear approximate relation derived by Campbell and Shiller (1988a). This
relation says that the log stock return rt+1,t h el o gs t o c kp r i c ept, and the log dividend
dt approximately satisfy
rt+1 = k + ρpt+1 +( 1− ρ)dt+1 − pt
= k +( dt − pt)+∆dt+1 − ρ(dt+1 − pt+1), (1)
where ρ is a coeﬃcient of loglinearization equal to the reciprocal of one plus the
steady-state level of the dividend-price ratio. Thus ρ is slightly smaller than one;
for annual US data, ρ =0 .96 is a reasonable value given an average dividend-price
ratio in the late 20th Century of about 4% or 0.04 in levels. This equation says
that proportional changes in stock prices have a larger eﬀect on returns than equal
3proportional changes in dividends, because the level of dividends is small relative to
the level of prices.
Equation (1) is a diﬀerence equation for the log dividend-price ratio. Solving it
forward, imposing a condition that there are no explosive bubbles in stock prices, and
taking expectations at time t allows us to interpret the dividend-price ratio as
dt − pt =
k
1 − ρ
+ Et
∞ X
j=0
ρ
j[rt+1+j − ∆dt+1+j]. (2)
This formula delivers a number of insights. First, it helps to motivate regressions
of stock returns on the log dividend-price ratio. The ratio is a linear combination
of discounted expectations of future stock returns and dividend growth. If dividend
growth is not too predictable (and there is little direct evidence for long-term dividend
predictability in US data), and if the dynamics of discount rates are such that short-
and long-term expected stock returns are highly correlated, then the log dividend-
price ratio should be a good proxy for the expected stock return over the next period.
Second, equation (2) shows that in the absence of price bubbles, the log dividend-
price ratio will be stationary if stock returns and dividend growth are stationary,
conditions that seem quite plausible. In particular, if returns and dividend growth
rates do not have time trends, then the log dividend-price ratio will not have a time
trend either. (This model cannot be used to say what would happen if there were time
trends in returns and dividend growth rates, because such trends would invalidate
the linear approximation (1).) Third, however, persistent variation in returns and
dividend growth rates can lead to persistent variation in the log dividend-price ratio
even if that ratio is stationary.
The eﬀect of persistence on predictive regressions has been highlighted by Stam-
baugh (1999). Stambaugh discusses the two-equation system
rt+1 = α + βxt + ut+1, (3)
xt+1 = μ + φxt + ηt+1, (4)
where xt can be any persistent predictor variable but attention focuses on the level
or log of the dividend-price ratio.
4OLS estimates of equation (3) in 20th Century US data, with the log dividend-
price ratio xt = dt − pt as the explanatory variable and the annualized stock return
as the dependent variable, tend to deliver estimates in the range 0.1 to 0.2. An
estimate of 0.04, the historical average level of the dividend-price ratio, would imply
that around the average, a percentage point increase in the level of the dividend-
price ratio increases the expected stock return by one percentage point. The OLS
estimates imply a sensitivity of the return to the dividend-price ratio that is several
times greater than this. They imply that when the dividend-price ratio is unusually
high, it tends to return to normal through increases in prices that magnify the eﬀect
on stock returns. Campbell and Shiller (1998) emphasize this pattern in the historical
data.
To understand Stambaugh’s concern about persistence, deﬁne
γ =
σuη
σ2
η
. (5)
The coeﬃcient γ is the regression coeﬃcient of return innovations on innovations to
the predictor variable. In the case where the explanatory variable is the log dividend-
price ratio, γ is negative because rising stock prices tend to be associated with a falling
dividend-price ratio. More precisely, dividend growth is only weakly correlated with
and much less volatile than stock returns, so from equation (1) γ is about −ρ,t h a t
is, slightly greater than −1.
Stambaugh points out that the bias in estimating the coeﬃcient β is γ times the
bias in estimating the persistence of the predictor variable, φ:
E[b β − β]=γE[b φ − φ]. (6)
This is signiﬁcant because it has been understood since the work of Kendall (1954)
that there is downward bias in estimates of φ of about −(1 + 3φ)/T,w h e r eT is the
sample size, primarily resulting from the fact that xt has an unknown mean that must
be estimated. With a highly persistent predictor variable and γ slightly greater than
−1, the Stambaugh bias in b β is almost 4/T.W i t h5 0y e a r so fd a t at h eb i a si sa l m o s t
0.08, substantial relative to the OLS estimates discussed above.
Recent responses to Stambaugh’s critique have all used theory in one way or
another. Lewellen (2004) ﬁrst writes an expression for the bias conditional on the
estimated persistence b φ and the true persistence φ:
E[b β − β |b φ, φ]=γ[b φ − φ]. (7)
5At ﬁrst sight this expression does not seem particularly useful because we do not know
the true persistence coeﬃcient. However, Lewellen argues on the basis of theory that
φ cannot be larger than one–the dividend-price ratio is not explosive–so the largest
bias occurs when φ =1 . He proposes the conservative approach of adjusting the
estimated coeﬃcient using this worst-case bias:
b βadj = b β − γ(b φ − 1). (8)
In the data, the log dividend-price ratio appears highly persistent. That is, b φ is
close to one; Lewellen reports a monthly estimate of 0.997 for the period 1946-2000, or
about 0.965 on an annual basis. Lewellen’s bias adjustment is therefore about 0.035,
much smaller than Stambaugh’s bias adjustment for a 50-year sample and somewhat
smaller whenever the sample size is less than 114 years. Lewellen argues that stock
returns are indeed predictable from the log dividend-price ratio, almost as much so as
a naive researcher, unaware of Stambaugh’s critique, might believe. Another way to
express Lewellen’s point is that data samples with spurious return predictability are
typically samples in which the log dividend-price ratio appears to mean-revert more
strongly than it truly does. In the historical data, the log dividend-price ratio has a
root very close to unity–it barely seems to mean-revert at all–and thus we should
not expect important spurious predictability in the historical data.
Cochrane (2007) responds to Stambaugh by directing attention to the inability
of the log-dividend price ratio to forecast dividend growth. At ﬁrst sight this re-
sponse does not seem connected to Lewellen’s, but in fact it is closely related. The
Campbell-Shiller loglinearization (1) implies that rt+1, ∆dt+1, dt+1−pt+1,a n ddt−pt
are deterministically linked. It follows that if we regress rt+1, ∆dt+1,a n ddt+1 − pt+1
onto dt − pt,t h ec o e ﬃcients β,βd,a n dφ are related by
β =1− ρφ + βd, (9)
where ρ is the coeﬃcient of loglinearization from equation (1).
If we have prior knowledge about φ,t h e nβ and βd are linked. For example, if
ρ =0 .96 and we know that φ ≤ 1,t h e nβd ≤ β − 0.04.I fβ =0 ,t h e nβd must be
negative and less than −0.04. The fact that regression estimates of βd are close to
zero is therefore indirect evidence that β>0, in other words that stock returns are
predictable–given our prior knowledge, based on theory, that the log dividend-price
ratio is not explosive.
6Another way to express Cochrane’s point is that if the dividend-price ratio fails to
predict stock returns, it will be explosive unless it predicts dividend growth. Since the
dividend-price ratio cannot be explosive, the absence of predictable dividend growth
strengthens the evidence for predictable returns.
Campbell and Yogo (2006) oﬀer a third response to Stambaugh. They point out
that if we knew persistence, we could reduce noise by adding the innovation to the
predictor variable to the predictive regression, estimating
rt+1 = α
0 + βxt + γ(xt+1 − φxt)+vt+1. (10)
The additional regressor, (xt+1−φxt)=ηt+1, is uncorrelated with the original regres-
sor xt but correlated with the dependent variable rt+1. Thus the regression (10) still
delivers a consistent estimate of the original predictive coeﬃcient β, but it does so
with increased precision because it controls for some of the noise in unexpected stock
returns.
Of course, in practice we do not know the persistence coeﬃcient φ,b u tC a m p b e l l
and Yogo argue that we can construct a conﬁdence interval for it by inverting a unit
root test. By doing this we “de-noise” the return and get a more powerful test. The
test delivers particularly strong evidence for predictability if we rule out a persistence
coeﬃcient φ>1 on prior grounds.
A way to understand Campbell and Yogo’s results is to recall the challenge posed
by the late 1990’s. In that period, the dividend-price ratio was low, which led Camp-
bell and Shiller (1998) to predict low stock returns based on a regression like (3).
In fact, stock returns remained high until the early 2000’s. These high returns were
accompanied by falling dividend yields despite the fact that the dividend yield was
already below its historical mean. If we believe that the dividend yield was below
its true mean and that it should be forecast to return to that mean rather than ex-
ploding away from it, then the late 1990’s declines in the dividend-price ratio must
have been unexpected. Unexpected declines in the dividend-price ratio are associated
with unexpected high stock returns, accounting for the poor performance of the ba-
sic predictability regression in the late 1990’s. The regression (10) corrects for this
eﬀect, limiting the negative inﬂuence of the late 1990’s on the estimated predictive
coeﬃcient β.
The econometric issues discussed in this section have little eﬀect on regressions
that use nominal interest rates or yield spreads to predict excess stock returns. Al-
though nominal interest rates are highly persistent, their innovations are not strongly
7correlated with innovations in stock returns and thus the coeﬃcient γ is close to zero
for these variables, implying only a trivial bias in OLS regression estimates. Even
papers that are skeptical of stock return predictability from the dividend-price ratio,
such as Ang and Bekaert (2007), emphasize the strength of the statistical evidence
that interest rates predict stock returns. The challenge in this case is primarily a
theoretical one, to understand the economic forces that cause common variation in
nominal interest rates and the equity premium.
All the papers discussed above combine prior knowledge with classical statistical
methods. It is of course possible to use ﬁnance theory in an explicit Bayesian manner.
Several recent papers have done this, notably Pastor and Stambaugh (2007) and
Wachter and Warusawitharana (2007). Consistent with the results reported here,
these papers ﬁnd that tight priors on the persistence of the predictor variable tend
to deliver stronger evidence for predictability of stock returns.
3 Steady-state return prediction
The papers discussed in the previous section address the question of whether the
equity premium varies with market valuations, or whether it is constant. Even if
one believes that the equity premium is time-varying, however, there remains the
important question of how best to estimate it at each point in time. Given the noise
in stock returns, equity premium models with multiple free coeﬃcients are hard to
estimate and may fail out of sample because of errors in estimating the coeﬃcients.
Indeed, Goyal and Welch (2007) argue that almost all the regression models proposed
in the recent literature fail to beat the historical sample mean when predicting excess
stock returns out of sample.
In response to Goyal and Welch, Campbell and Thompson (2007) propose to
use steady-state valuation models to estimate the equity premium. Such models
tightly restrict the way in which historical data are used to predict future returns,
and Campbell and Thompson ﬁnd that they work well out of sample. Fama and
French (2002) and Pastor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2007) also use this approach to
analyze the equity premium. The approach is analogous to the familiar procedure
of forecasting the return on a bond using its yield rather than its historical average
return.
8The classic steady-state model is the Gordon growth model, named after Canadian
economist Myron Gordon. The model describes the level of the dividend-price ratio
in a steady state with a constant discount rate and growth rate. Using upper-case
letters to denote levels of variables, the Gordon growth model can be written as:
D
P
= R − G. (11)
This formula can be used directly with historical dividend growth rates, but it
can also be rewritten in several ways that suggest alternative empirical strategies for
forecasting stock returns. First, one can substitute out growth by using the steady-
state relation between growth and accounting return on equity,
G =( 1−
D
E
)ROE, (12)
where D/E is the payout ratio, to obtain a growth-adjusted return forecast
b RDP =
D
P
+( 1−
D
E
)ROE. (13)
This return forecast is linear in D/P,w i t has l o p ec o e ﬃcient of one and an intercept
that is determined by the reinvestment rate and proﬁtability. Importantly, neither
the slope coeﬃcient nor the intercept need to be estimated from noisy historical stock
returns.
Second, one can restate the model in terms of the earnings-price ratio by using
D/P =( D/E)(E/P) to obtain
b REP =
µ
D
E
¶
E
P
+( 1−
D
E
)ROE, (14)
a payout-ratio-weighted average of the earnings-price ratio and the accounting return
on equity. When return on equity equals the expected return, as might be the case
in long-run equilibrium, then this implies that b REP = E/P.
Finally, one can rewrite the model in terms of the book-market ratio. Since
E/P =( B/M)ROE,
b RBM = ROE
∙
1+
D
E
µ
B
M
− 1
¶¸
. (15)
9To use these formulas in practice, one must decide how to combine historical and
contemporaneous data on the right hand side variables. Campbell and Thompson
(2007) follow Fama and French (2002) by using historical average data on payouts
and proﬁtability, but diﬀer from them by using current rather than historical average
data on valuation ratios to obtain a return forecast conditional on the market’s current
valuation level. This procedure assumes that movements in valuation ratios, relative
to historical cash ﬂows, are explained by permanent changes in expected returns so
that each percentage point increase in the level of the dividend-price ratio generates
a percentage point increase in the return forecast. It is a compromise between the
view that valuation ratios are driven by changing forecasts of proﬁtability, in which
case the implied movements in returns would be smaller, and the view that valuation
ratios are driven by temporary changes in discount rates, in which case the implied
return movements would be larger as discussed in the previous section.
Campbell and Thompson evaluate the out-of-sample performance of these models
and several other variants over the period 1927-2005 and subsamples with breakpoints
at 1956 and 1980. They ﬁnd that steady-state valuation models typically perform
better when more theoretical restrictions are imposed, and that they almost always
outperform the historical mean return as a predictor of future returns. Dividend-
based and earnings-based models, equations (13) and (14), generally appear to be
more successful than the book-market model (15). In the next section I illustrate this
approach using a model that averages both the dividend-price ratio and the recent
history of earnings to generate a return forecast that is a blend of those from (13)
and (14).
3.1 The Gordon model with a random walk dividend-price
ratio
It may at ﬁrst sight appear strange that steady-state valuation models based on
the Gordon growth model perform well given that they assume constant valuation
ratios, while in the data valuation ratios vary in a highly persistent manner. It
turns out, however, that a variant of the Gordon growth model can be derived using
the assumption that the log dividend-price ratio follows a random walk. Under this
assumption the Campbell-Shiller loglinear model, used in the previous section, breaks
down because the dividend-price ratio has no ﬁx e dm e a na r o u n dw h i c ht ot a k ea
loglinear approximation. However in this case a suitable version of the original Gordon
10growth model is available to take the place of the Campbell-Shiller model.
To show this I assume, as in the Gordon growth model, that the dividend is known
o n ep e r i o di na d v a n c e .T h e nw ec a nw r i t e
Dt+1
Pt
=e x p ( xt), (16)
where xt now denotes the log dividend-price ratio using a forward or indicated divi-
dend rather than a historical dividend. I assume that xt follows a random walk:
xt = xt−1 + εt. (17)
Since the dividend growth rate is known one period in advance, I can write
Dt+1
Dt
=1+Gt =e x p ( gt). (18)
Finally, I assume that xt+1 and gt+1 are conditionally normal given time t information.
The deﬁnition of the stock return implies that
1+Rt+1 =
Pt+1 + Dt+1
Pt
=
Dt+1
Pt
+
Dt+2
Dt+1
Dt+1
Pt
µ
Dt+2
Pt+1
¶−1
=e x p ( xt)[1+exp(gt+1 − xt+1)]. (19)
The conditionally expected stock return can be calculated using the formula for the
conditional expectation of lognormally distributed random variables and the martin-
gale property that Etxt+1 = xt:
Et(1 + Rt+1)=e x p ( xt)[1+E t exp(gt+1 − xt+1)]
=e x p ( xt)[1 + exp(Etgt+1 − xt + σ
2
g/2+σ
2
x/2 − σgx)]
=
Dt+1
Pt
+e x p ( E tgt+1)exp(V ar t(pt+1 − pt)/2). (20)
Finally, the right hand side of (20) can be approximated using the facts that for
small y, exp(y) ≈ 1+y, and that unexpected log stock returns are approximately
11equal to unexpected changes in log stock prices:
Et(1 + Rt+1) ≈
Dt+1
Pt
+e x p ( E tgt+1)+
1
2
Vart(rt+1). (21)
This equation expresses the expected stock return as the level of the dividend yield,
plus geometric average dividend growth, plus one-half the variance of stock returns.
In the original Gordon model, σ2
x =0s ot h ev a r i a n c eo fs t o c kr e t u r n se q u a l st h ev a r i -
ance of dividend growth. Since arithmetic average dividend growth equals geometric
average dividend growth plus one-half the variance of dividend growth, in this case
we get the original Gordon formula that the arithmetic average stock return equals
dividend yield plus arithmetic average dividend growth.
If one subtracts half the variance of stock returns from each side of (20), one
ﬁnds that the geometric average stock return equals the level of the dividend-price
ratio plus the geometric average of dividend growth. Under the assumptions of the
original Gordon model, the geometric implementation of the model is equivalent to
an arithmetic implementation because stock returns and dividend growth have the
same variance so their geometric and arithmetic averages diﬀe rb yt h es a m ea m o u n t .
In the data, however, returns are much more volatile so the geometric implementation
and the arithmetic implementation are diﬀerent. The analysis here shows that the
geometric implementation is correct. Interestingly, this is exactly the way in which
the model is used by Siegel (1994).
4 What is the equity premium today?
I now use a version of the above methodology, starting from equation (14), to estimate
the equity premium. Following the previous discussion, I ﬁrst estimate the conditional
geometric average stock return, then subtract the real interest rate to get an equity
premium number, and ﬁnally discuss the adjustment that is needed to convert from
a geometric average to an arithmetic average equity premium. I look at data for the
world as a whole (measured using the Morgan Stanley Capital International all-world
index), and also for the US and Canada, over the period from 1982 through the end
of March 2007.
Figure 1 shows that for all three indices smoothed earnings-price ratios, with
earnings smoothed over three years to eliminate cyclical noise, have fallen dramatically
12since the early 1980’s and have been in the 3% to 5% range for the last ten years.
During the same period, however, Figure 2 shows that proﬁtability has increased
from a long-run historical average of around 6% to much higher values around 10%.
Meanwhile payout ratios have ﬂuctuated widely around an average of about 50%.
In constructing a return forecast, it is desirable to combine historical earnings with
some forward-looking measure of earnings. One possibility is to use analysts’ earnings
forecasts (Pastor, Sinha, and Swaminathan 2007), another is to use dividends. I
average historical earnings, smoothed over three years, and the current dividend,
divided by the payout rate, to construct a forward-looking measure of permanent
earnings that can be used in equation (14).
Putting these numbers together, an earnings-based estimate of the real return
on US equities, assuming constant 6% real proﬁtability and a 50% payout rate, was
about 9% in the early 1980’s and fell to just above 4% in the year 2000. Since then
it has increased to slightly over 5%. This estimate assumes that proﬁtability and
payouts are best forecast to be constant; alternatively, if one uses the 3-year moving
average of proﬁtability illustrated in Figure 2, and a similar 3-year moving average
of the payout ratio, the current real return estimate increases by almost 4% to 9%,
reﬂecting the high recent proﬁtability and low payout ratios of US corporations. At
the world level, the current real return number is comparable to the US number if
a ﬁxed proﬁtability estimate is used, but the adjustment for recent proﬁtability and
payouts is much smaller, only slightly above 2%. The Canadian real return number
is also very similar to that in the US on the basis of ﬁxed proﬁtability, but lower
Canadian proﬁtability and higher payouts in the last few years imply that the use of
recent data increases the estimated real return by less than 2%.
To convert these numbers into estimates of the equity premium, one needs to
subtract a safe real interest rate. Figure 3 plots real yields on inﬂation-indexed bonds
in three large markets, the UK, the US, and Canada. The ﬁgure shows that the
average real yield on inﬂation-indexed bonds across the three countries was about
3.5% in the 1990’s but fell below 2% in the early 2000’s. By the end of March 2007,
it had recovered to just over 2%.
The implied current equity premium, assuming constant proﬁtability and payouts,
is just over 3%: 3.3% for the world as a whole, 3.2% for the US, and 3.1% for Canada.
If instead one uses recent proﬁtability and payouts, the current equity premium is
5.7% for the world as a whole, a startling 6.9% for the US, and 5.0% for Canada.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 illustrate the history of the equity premium in the world, the US,
13and Canada under these two alternative assumptions.
Obviously a key question is whether the high proﬁtability of global, and particu-
larly US, corporations can be expected to continue. On the one hand, globalization
has increased the supply of labor relative to capital, reducing wage pressure and in-
creasing proﬁtability; on the other hand, proﬁtability has been increased by favorable
business cycle and political conditions that may not persist. Historically, proﬁtabil-
ity has shown temporary ﬂuctuations and low payout rates (high reinvestment rates)
have predicted declining proﬁtability. Also, equity premium estimates based on cur-
rent proﬁtability and payout rates have been highly volatile, even turning negative
on occasion. For both these reasons it seems wise to place considerably more weight
on long-term averages than on recent data. If one puts a weight of 0.75 on the long-
term average, with 0.25 on the recent data, the implied equity premium at the end
of March 2007 is in the range 3.6% to 4.1%: 3.9% in the world as a whole, 4.1% in
the US, and 3.6% in Canada. This number is a geometric average equity premium;
for an arithmetic average, one should add one-half the variance of stock returns, or
almost 1.3% if stock returns have a conditional standard deviation of 16%. The re-
sulting arithmetic equity premium numbers are in the range 4.9% to 5.4%. Note that
t h ee q u i t yp r e m i u mi st h i sh i g hi nl a r g ep a r tb e c a u s et h es a f er e a li n t e r e s tr a t eh a s
declined over the past decade as illustrated in Figure 3.
These numbers are lower than historical average excess stock returns reported by
Dimson, Marsh, and Staunton (2006). Using data for the period 1900-2005, Dimson,
Marsh, and Staunton report geometric average equity premia of 4.7% for the world
as a whole, 5.5% for the US, and 4.5% for Canada. The diﬀerence reﬂects two facts.
First, historical average returns have been driven up by declining valuation ratios; this
eﬀect cannot be expected to continue in the future because valuation ratios should
not have trends, a point emphasized by Fama and French (2002). Second, historical
average returns were obtained by investors who paid lower stock prices and thus
beneﬁted from higher dividend-price ratios.
It is interesting to note that chief ﬁnancial oﬃcers of major corporations, surveyed
by Graham and Harvey (2007), have modest expectations of the equity premium that
imply they do not expect recent proﬁtability to continue. Their median estimate of
the geometric average US equity premium at the end of November 2006 was 3.4%,
much closer to the constant-proﬁtability number reported here than to the recent-
proﬁtability number, and far below the historical average equity premium.
145 Return prediction with cross-sectional variables
Finance theory can also be used to predict excess stock returns using information in
the cross-section of stock prices. This is valuable both to corroborate the predictions
from aggregate valuation ratios, and possibly as a way to pick up higher-frequency
components of the equity premium that may be missed by a steady-state approach.
Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho (2006) argue that if the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) is true, then a high equity premium implies low prices for stocks that
have high betas with the aggregate market index. That is, high-beta stocks should be
value stocks with low ratios of market prices to accounting measures of fundamental
value. Reversing the argument, value stocks should tend to have high betas. This
was true in the mid-20th Century, roughly from the 1930’s through the 1950’s, but
in recent decades growth stocks have had higher betas than value stocks (Franzoni
2006). Polk, Thompson, and Vuolteenaho argue that this change in cross-sectional
stock pricing reﬂects a decline in the equity premium. They construct a predictor
of the aggregate market return, based on the relative pricing of high- and low-beta
stocks, and show that it correlates well with the smoothed earnings-price ratio except
in the early 1980’s when inﬂation may have distorted the relationship.
It is possible to push this idea even further, exploiting the fact that the CAPM
may not fully describe the cross-section of stock returns when returns are predictable
in the time series. Merton (1973) developed an intertemporal CAPM (ICAPM) that
showed that in the presence of time-varying expected returns, long-lived investors care
not only about shocks to their wealth but also about shocks to the expected return
on wealth. Intuitively, they value wealth not for its own sake but for the consumption
stream it can provide; thus they want to hedge against declines in the rate of return
just as much as against declines in market value. Campbell (1993) implemented this
idea using a vector autoregression (VAR) to break market movements into permanent
movements driven by news about cash ﬂows and temporary movements driven by news
about discount rates. Long-lived investors are more concerned about the former than
about the latter. Thus stocks that covary with cash-ﬂow news should have higher
average returns than stocks that covary with discount-rate news, controlling for betas
with the overall market return.
One of the main deviations from the CAPM in recent decades has been the value
eﬀect, the high average returns that value stocks have delivered despite their low
market betas. If the ICAPM is to explain the value eﬀect, it must be that value stocks
15covary with cash-ﬂow news while growth stocks covary with discount-rate news. This
implies that a moving average of past excess returns on growth stocks should be a
good predictor of aggregate stock returns.
The value spread, the relative valuation of value and growth stocks (normally
measured as the diﬀerence between the log book-market ratios of these two types of
stocks) is one possible summary of past excess returns on growth stocks. Eleswarapu
and Reinganum (2004) ﬁnd that the value spread for small stocks predicts the aggre-
gate market return, and Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) use the same variable in
aV A Rm o d e lt oe s t i m a t ea n dt e s tt h eI C A P M .T h e yﬁnd that the ICAPM explains
the average returns of value and growth stocks much better than does the standard
CAPM. Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2006) and Campbell, Polk, and Vuolteenaho
(2007) explore the robustness of these results, using both VAR-based and direct mea-
sures of cash-ﬂow and discount-rate news. Empirically, the eﬀect of including the
small-stock value spread in a model of the equity premium is to lower the estimated
equity premium at the turn of the millennium, when growth stocks were abnormally
expensive relative to value stocks, and to increase it in 2006 and early 2007, when
growth stocks were abnormally cheap.
All this work relies on theoretically motivated, but not fully restricted, time-series
models of the aggregate market return. A natural next step is to use the theoretical
restrictions of the ICAPM to jointly estimate a time-series model of the aggregate
market return and a cross-sectional model of average stock returns. Campbell (1996)
was an early implementation of this approach, but that paper did not ﬁnd systematic
d e v i a t i o n sf r o mt h eC A P Mb e c a u s ei td i dn o tu s et h ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h er e l a t i v ep r i c e s
of growth and value stocks. Recent research suggests that with the proper information
variables and test assets, cross-sectional information can play an important role in a
jointly estimated model of the equity premium.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper I have tried to illustrate the usefulness of ﬁnance theory for statistical
analysis of stock returns, and in particular for estimation of the equity premium.
The literature on this topic is vast, and inevitably I have neglected some important
aspects. Five omissions deserve special mention.
16First, I have not reviewed the simple but important point that excess stock returns
should be diﬃcult to predict, because highly predictable excess returns would imply
extremely large proﬁts for market-timing investors. Campbell and Thompson (2007)
explore the mapping from R2 statistics in predictive regressions to proﬁts and welfare
gains for market timers. The basic lesson is that investors should be suspicious of
predictive regressions with high R2 statistics, asking the old question “If you’re so
smart, why aren’t you rich?”
Second, I have conﬁned attention to short-term predictive regressions and have not
considered direct forecasts of long-horizon returns. It has been known since Fama and
French (1988) that long-horizon regressions often have higher R2 statistics than short-
horizon regressions, but their statistical properties are controversial. Campbell (2001)
and Cochrane (2007) argue that in certain circumstances, long-horizon regressions can
have superior power to detect predictability when in fact it exists.
Third, I have not discussed recent work that uses ﬁnance theory to infer the equity
p r e m i u mf r o mt h ea c t i o n so fm a r k e tp a r t i c i pants. Lettau and Ludvigson (2001), for
example, argue that the level of consumption in relation to aggregate ﬁnancial wealth
and labor income reveals consumers’ expectations of future stock returns. In a similar
spirit Baker and Wurgler (2000) use the ﬁnancing decisions of corporations to infer
corporate managers’ beliefs about expected stock returns.
Fourth, I have presented estimates of the equity premium without discussing the
uncertainty of these estimates. I have suggested that ﬁnance theory can reduce our
uncertainty about the equity premium, but a more formal Bayesian analysis would
be needed to quantify this eﬀect.
Finally, I have not attempted to review the important body of empirical work
on the estimation of stock market risk. Mechanically, the volatility of stock returns
determines the wedge between geometric and arithmetic average stock returns. Eco-
nomically, both risk and return matter to investors, and it is plausible that changing
risk is one factor that drives the changing equity premium. Merton (1980), Camp-
bell (1987), French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987), Harvey (1989), and Glosten,
Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993) are a few of the earlier papers that explore this
relation. Recent contributions by Ghysels, Santa-Clara, and Valkanov (2005) and
Pastor, Sinha, and Swaminathan (2007) ﬁnd that the equity premium does covary
positively with estimated risk, but that this eﬀect does not explain the predictability
of stock returns from valuation ratios or interest rates.
17Despite the size and complexity of the literature on the equity premium, it has
a simple unifying theme. Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) argue that “what
distinguishes ﬁnancial economics is the central role that uncertainty plays in both
ﬁnancial theory and its empirical implementation”. Theory tells us why stock returns
are so hard to predict. But it also holds out the promise of better prediction than we
can hope to achieve by purely statistical forecasting methods.
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